THREE MILLION TONNES, BUT NOT YET ON TRACK Part One: The Production Gap Behind Zambia’s Copper Ambition

Introduction: National Three (3) Million Tonnes Copper Production Strategy By 2031c Zambia’s ambition to produce three million tonnes of copper annually by 2031 is bold and economically important. If achieved, it could strengthen exports, expand fiscal revenues, deepen local supply chains and support greater value addition. But a production target is not a forecast. Its […]

Introduction: National Three (3) Million Tonnes Copper Production Strategy By 2031c

Zambia’s ambition to produce three million tonnes of copper annually by 2031 is bold and economically important. If achieved, it could strengthen exports, expand fiscal revenues, deepen local supply chains and support greater value addition. But a production target is not a forecast. Its credibility must be tested against actual output and the investments, energy and institutions required to deliver it.

The central question is therefore not whether three million tonnes is desirable, but whether Zambia’s current production path is converging towards it. The numbers show a recovery, but they also show that the target path is moving considerably faster.

Is Zambia’s Three-Million-Tonne Goal Slipping Away: Zambia’s Production Shortfall

The latest production numbers suggest that the country is not yet on the target path. Copper production rose from 728,558 metric tonnes in 2023 to 824,425metric tonnes in 2024 and 890,346 metric tonnes in 2025. On the surface, this appears to show progress. Yet when set against the official growth annual target path, the picture changes sharply. Compared with projected targets of 738,228 Mt, 980,165 Mt, and 1,300,056 Mt respectively. The production shortfall widened from 1.31% in 2023 to 15.89% in 2024 and 31.51% in 2025. This sustained deterioration suggests that the gap is not temporary but is continuing to grow.

The Arithmetic Zambia’s Three-Million-Tonne Ambition Must Confront

That widening shortfall matters because each missed target increases the growth required in the years ahead. Using the Standard Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR), moving from the actual 2025 output to more than three million tonnes by 2031 would require production to grow by about 22.4% per year. Furthermore, moving from the 2025 actual output to 3,044,985 Mt by 2030 would require output to grow by about 27.9% per year. These percentages are significantly higher than the projected 18.6% growth rate and 14.95% for the 2025-2030 and 2025-2031 periods respectively. More recently, current production trends also show that output is moving in the opposite direction of the growth required to meet the 2030/31 target. Rather than accelerating toward the target needed, the short-term production trend remains negative. Based on the latest 2026 Ministry of Finance and National Planning Quarter Economic Review, in the first quarter of 2026, copper production declined by 13.1%, falling to 208,993 Mt from 240,539 Mt in the fourth quarter of 2025. Thus, the longer copper production remains below target, the steeper the climb becomes.

Existing Mines Will Decide the Near-Term Outcome

The near-term copper production story will be decided less by greenfield discoveries than by whether legacy mines can recover and sustain output. Konkola Copper Mines (KCM), Mopani and other operating mines already have shafts, plants, workforces and supplier networks, therefore, restarts and brownfield expansions can deliver before greenfield discoveries, making existing mines the fastest available test of Zambia’s copper promise, but not a guaranteed rescue. Greenfield discoveries cannot close a near-term gap unless licensing, geoscience, drilling and study pipelines are accelerated without weakening scrutiny as faster approvals may compromise environmental and community safeguards. The copper production warning is wrong if these existing mines deliver the required incremental tonnes on schedule with stable recovery, competitive unit costs, firm power and no weakening of safeguards.

Part Two will examine the fiscal side of this crossroads: why high copper prices can temporarily strengthen revenues even when production underperforms, and why Zambia must avoid building permanent public expenditure on a commodity windfall that may not last.

By Robinson Nakambo

About the Author

Robinson Nakambo is the Lead Researcher for Public Finance Management at the Centre for Trade Policy and Development (CTPD). He holds a Bachelor of Economics (Honours) and a Master of Science in Economics from the University of Namibia (UNAM). While pursuing his Master’s programme, He participated in the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Joint Facility for Electives (JFE), a pan-African advanced graduate-level programme, specializing in Health Economics and Financial Economics.